is a communication primitive that requires that if a process delivers a message, then all correct processes also deliver this message. A recent paper [HR99] uses Knowledge Theory to determine what failure detectors are necessary to implement this primitive in asynchronous systems with process crashes and lossy links that are fair. In this paper, we revisit this problem using a different approach, and provide a result that is simpler, more intuitive, and, in a precise sense, more general.
Introduction
Uniform Reliable Broadcast (URB) is a communication primitive that requires that if a process delivers a message, then all correct processes also deliver this message [HT94] . A recent paper [HR99] uses Knowledge Theory to determine what failure detectors are necessary to implement this primitive in asynchronous systems with process crashes and fair links (roughly speaking, a fair link may lose an infinite number of messages, but if a message is sent infinitely often then it is eventually received).
1 In this paper, we revisit this problem using an algorithmic-reduction approach [CHT96] , and provide a result that is simpler, more intuitive, and, in a precise sense, more general, as we now explain.
[HR99] considered systems where up to f processes may crash and links are fair, and used Knowledge Theory to show that solving URB in such a system requires a generalized f -useful failure detector (denoted G f in here). Such a failure detector is parameterized by f and is described in Fig. 1 . [HR99] shows that when f = n or f = n − 1, G f is equivalent to a perfect failure detector.
In this paper, we revisit this problem using the approach in [CHT96] , and give a simpler characterization of the failure detectors that can solve URB in systems with process crashes and fair links. More precisely, we prove that the A generalized failure detector [HR99] outputs a pair (S, k) where S is a subset of processes and k is a positive integer. Intuitively, the failure detector outputs (S, k) to report that k processes in S are faulty. In a run r, the failure detector event suspect p (S, k) is said to be f -useful for r if (a) S contains all processes that crash in r, and (b) n − |S| > min(f, n − 1) − k. A generalized failure detector is f -useful if, for all runs r and processes p, the following two properties hold (where rp(t) denotes the prefix of run r at process p up to time t):
-If suspect p (S, k) is in rp(t) then there is a subset S ⊆ S such that |S | = k and for all q ∈ S , we have that crashq is in rq(t). -If p is correct, then there is a f -useful failure-detector event for r in rp(t), for some t. weakest failure detector for this problem is a simple failure detector denoted Θ. Θ outputs a set of processes that are currently trusted to be up, 2 such that:
Completeness: There is a time after which processes do not trust any process that crashes. Accuracy: If some process never crashes then, at every time, every process trusts at least one process that never crashes.
This simple characterization of the weakest failure detector for URB is more general than the one given in [HR99] , in the sense that it holds for any system with fair links, regardless of f or any other types of restrictions or dependencies on process crashes.
3 To illustrate this point, consider the following three systems with n processors {p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n }:
1. In system S 1 , every processor may crash, except that we assume that p 1 and p 2 cannot both crash in the same run (this assumption makes sense if, for example, p 1 and p 2 are configured as symmetric primary/backup servers). Note that in S 1 , up to f = n − 1 processors may crash in the same run. 2. In system S 2 , every processor may crash, except that processor p 1 is a faulttolerant highly-available computing server that crashes only when it is left alone in the system (this assumption is not unreasonable: in some existing systems, processes kill themselves if they are unable to communicate with a minimum number of processes). Note that in S 2 , up to f = n processors may crash in the same run.
3. In system S 3 , the number of processes that crash is bounded, but this bound f is not given. Moreover, there are some additional restrictions and dependencies on process crashes (e.g., if more than half of the processes crash then a certain process p 1 commits suicide) but these are also not given.
What is the weakest failure detector for solving URB in each of S 1 , S 2 and S 3 ? By our result, the answer is simply Θ.
In contrast, the result in [HR99] cannot be applied to S 1 , S 2 and S 3 , as we now explain. For S 3 , this is obvious because f is not given. For S 1 , the value of f , namely n − 1, is given, but the result in [HR99] cannot be used, because it assumes that every set of (up to) n − 1 processes may crash in a run -an assumption that does not hold for S 1 . Similarly, for S 2 , one cannot apply the result in [HR99] .
Since, in some sense, both G f and Θ are "minimal" for URB, an important question is now in order: What is the relation between G f and Θ? To answer this question, we use the notions of failure patterns and environments [CHT96] . Roughly speaking, a failure pattern indicates, for each process p, whether p crashes and, if so, when. An environment E is a set of failure patterns; and a system with environment E is one where the process crashes must match one of the failure patterns in E. Intuitively, environments allow us to express restrictions on process crashes, such as "either p 1 or p 2 , but not both, may crash" (so environments can be used to formally define the systems S 1 and S 2 described earlier). A commonly-used environment in the literature is E f , the set of all failure patterns in which at most f processes crash: A system with environment E f allows up to f process crashes, but there are no other constraints or dependencies, i.e., any subset of f process may crash, and these crashes can occur at any time.
We can now compare G f and Θ. Roughly speaking, Θ is the weakest failure detector for URB regardless of the environment E, while G f is necessary and sufficient for URB in environment E f . When E = E f , there is an algorithm that transforms G f into Θ, and so Θ is at least as weak as G f in environment E f .
4
An important difference between [HR99] and this paper is that [HR99] uses Knowledge Theory [FHMV95] to establish and state its results, while we use algorithmic reductions [CT96] . An advantage of the algorithmic reduction method over the knowledge approach, is that the former allows the derivation of a stronger result: in a nutshell, the knowledge approach determines only what information about failures processes know , while the algorithmic reduction method determines what information about failures processes know and can effectively compute. Specifically, the result in [HR99] is that, in order to solve URB, processes must know the information provided by G f . This does not automatically imply that processes can actually compute G f .
5
In contrast, the algorithmic reduction given in this paper shows that if processes can solve URB with some failure detector D, then they can use D to compute failure detector Θ. This reduction implies that D is at least as strong as Θ in terms of problem solving: if processes can solve a problem with Θ, they can also solve it with D (by first using D to compute Θ). Note we would not be able to say that D is at least as strong as Θ (in terms of problem solving) if D only allowed processes to know (but not compute) the information provided by Θ.
Finally, there is another difference between our approach and the one in [HR99] , namely, the universe of failure detectors that is being considered. To understand the meaning of a statement such as "D is the weakest failure detector...", or "D is necessary...", one needs to know the universe of failure detectors under consideration (because it is among these failure detectors that D is the "weakest" or "necessary"). In our paper, the universe of failure detectors is explicit and clear: a failure detector is a function of the failure pattern -a natural definition that is widely used [CT96, CHT96, ACT98, HMR97, OGS97, YNG98, LH94] etc. The universe of failure detectors in [HR99] , however, is implicitly defined, and the exact nature and power of the failure detectors considered are not entirely clear. This issue is further discussed in Sect. 8.
In summary, in this paper we consider the problem of determining the weakest failure detector for solving URB in systems with process crashes and lossy links -a problem that was first investigated in [HR99] . In [HR99] , this problem was studied using the framework of Knowledge Theory. In this paper, we tackle this problem using a different approach based on the standard failure detector models and techniques of [CHT96] . The results that we obtain are simple, intuitive and general. More precisely:
1. We provide a single failure detector Θ, and show that it is the weakest failure detector for URB, in any environment. In particular, our result holds even if f is not given.
In environment E f , Θ is at least as weak as G f . 2. Θ is simple and a natural candidate for solving URB. As a result, the algorithm that uses Θ to solve URB in any environment E, is immediate. 3. Our results are derived and can be understood from first principles (they do not require Knowledge Theory). 4. Our "minimality" result is in terms of effective computation, not knowledge: roughly speaking, if processes can solve URB, we show how they can compute Θ (this implies knowledge of the information provided by Θ; but the converse does not necessarily hold). 5. The universe of failure detectors (with respect to which our minimality result holds) is given explicitly through a simple definition.
The paper is organized as follows. Our model is described in Sect. 2. In Sect. 3, we explain what it means for a failure detector to be weaker than another one.
unsolved problem in Number Theory, and they also know whether any given Turing Machine halts on blank tape.
Section 4 defines the uniform reliable broadcast problem. Failure detector Θ is defined in Sect. 5, and in Sect. 6, we show how to use it to implement uniform reliable broadcast in systems with process crashes and fair links. In Sect. 7 we show that Θ is actually the weakest failure detector for this problem. In Sect. 8, we briefly discuss the nature and power of failure detectors, and in Sect. 9 we consider the relation between G f and Θ. Related work is discussed in Sect. 10 and we conclude the paper in Sect. 11.
Model
Throughout this paper, in all our results, we consider asynchronous messagepassing distributed systems in which there are no timing assumptions. In particular, we make no assumptions on the time it takes to deliver a message, or on relative process speeds. The system consists of a set of n processes Π = {1, 2, . . . , n} that are completely connected by point-to-point (bidirectional) links. The system can experience both process failures and link failures. Processes can fail by crashing, and links can fail by dropping messages. The model, based on the one in [CHT96] , is described next.
We assume the existence of a discrete global clock -this is merely a fictional device to simplify the presentation and processes do not have access to it. We take the range T of the clock's ticks to be the set of natural numbers.
Failure Patterns and Environments
Processes can fail by crashing, i.e., by halting prematurely. A failure pattern F is a function from T to 2 Π . Intuitively, F (t) denotes the set of processes that have crashed through time t. Once a process crashes, it does not "recover", i.e., ∀t : F (t) ⊆ F (t + 1). We define crashed(F ) = t∈T F (t) and correct(F ) = Π \ crashed(F ). If p ∈ crashed(F ) we say p crashes (or is faulty) in F and if p ∈ correct(F ) we say p is correct in F .
An environment E is a set of failure patterns. As we explained in the introduction, environments describe the crashes that can occur in a system. Links can fail by dropping messages, but we assume that links are fair. Roughly speaking, a fair link from p to q may intermittently drop messages, and may do so infinitely often, but it must satisfy the following "fairness" property: if p repeatedly sends some message to q and q does not crash, then q eventually receives that message. This is made more precise in Sect. 2.3.
Failure Detectors
Each process has access to a local failure detector module that provides (possibly incorrect) information about the failure pattern that occurs in an execution. A failure detector history H with range R is a function from Π × T to R. H(p, t) is the output value of the failure detector module of process p at time t. A failure detector D is a function that maps each failure pattern F to a non-empty set 
Runs of Algorithms
An algorithm A is a collection of n (possibly infinite-state) deterministic automata, one for each process in the system. Computation proceeds in atomic steps of A. In each step, a process may: receive a message from a process, get an external input, query its failure detector module, undergo a state transition, send a message to a neighbor, and issue an external output.
A run of algorithm A using failure detector D is a tuple R = (F, H D , I, S, T ) where F is a failure pattern, H D ∈ D(F ) is a history of failure detector D for failure pattern F , I is an initial configuration of A, S is an infinite sequence of steps of A, and T is an infinite list of increasing time values indicating when each step in S occurs.
A run must satisfy some properties for every process p: If p has crashed by time t, i.e., p ∈ F (t), then p does not take a step at any time t ≥ t; if p is correct, i.e., p ∈ correct(F ), then p takes an infinite number of steps; and if p takes a step at time t and queries its failure detector, then p gets H D (p, t) as a response.
A run must also satisfy the following "fair link properties" for every pair of processes p and q: 
Failure Detector Transformations
As explained in [CT96, CHT96] E) ; what we do require is that all the failure detector histories it emulates be histories of D (in that environment).
Uniform Reliable Broadcast
Uniform Reliable Broadcast (URB) is defined in terms of two primitives: broadcast(m) and deliver(m). We say that process p broadcasts message m if p invokes broadcast(m). We assume that every broadcast message m includes the following fields: the identity of its sender, denoted sender (m), and a sequence number, denoted seq(m). These fields make every broadcast message unique. We say that q delivers message m if q returns from the invocation of deliver(m)
Validity and Uniform Agreement imply that if a correct process broadcasts a message m, then all correct processes eventually deliver m.
Failure Detector Θ
We now define failure detector Θ. Each failure detector module of Θ outputs a set of processes that are trusted to be up, i.e., R Θ = 2 Π . For each failure pattern F , Θ(F ) is the set of all failure detector histories H with range R Θ that satisfy the following properties:
There is a time after which correct processes do not trust any process that crashes. More precisely:
If there is a correct process then, at every time, every process trusts at least one correct process. More precisely:
Note that a process may be trusted even if it has actually crashed. Moreover, the correct processes trusted by a process p is allowed to change over time (in fact, it can change infinitely often), and it is not necessarily the same as the correct process trusted by another process q.
Using Θ to Implement Uniform Reliable Broadcast
The algorithm that implements URB using Θ is shown in Fig. 2 
Theorem 1. Consider an asynchronous distributed system with process crashes and fair links, and with environment E. The algorithm in Fig. 2 implements URB using Θ in E.
The proof is straightforward and can be found in [ATD99] .
The Weakest Failure Detector for Uniform Reliable Broadcast
We now show that, in any environment, a failure detector D that can be used to solve URB can be transformed to Θ. We now proceed to prove this theorem. Let E be an environment, D be a failure detector that can be used to solve URB in E, and A URB be the URB algorithm that uses D. We describe an algorithm T D→Θ that transforms D into Θ in E. Intuitively, this algorithm works as follows.
Consider k 1 -th query) . By periodically sending its current version of the DAG to all processes, and incorporating all the DAGs that it receives into its own DAG, a process can construct an ever increasing DAG that includes the failure detector values seen by processes and some of their temporal relationships.
It turns out that a process p can use its DAG to simulate runs of A URB with failure pattern F and failure detector history H. These are runs that could have occurred if processes were running A URB instead of T D→Θ .
To illustrate this, let p be a process, and consider a path in its DAG, say
In T D→Θ , process p uses this path to simulate a run R sim of A URB . In R sim , q 0 takes the 0-th step, q 1 takes the 1-st step, q 2 takes the 2-nd step, and so on. In the 0-th step, q 0 broadcasts m 0 . Moreover, for every j, in the j-th step process q j sees failure detector value d j and receives the oldest message sent to it that it has not yet received (if there are no such messages, it receives nothing). It turns out that, if failure pattern F has some correct process, then process p can extract from R sim a list of processes that contains at least one such a correct process. To see how, consider the step of R sim when a process first delivers m 0 , and suppose this is the k-th step. Then, among processes {q 0 , . . . , q k } (those that took steps before the delivery of m 0 ), there is at least one that never crashes in F . If that were not the case, we could construct another run R BAD of A URB with failure pattern F and failure detector history H, where (1) up to the k-th step, processes behave as in R sim , (2) after the k-th step, processes {q 0 , . . . , q k } all crash, and all messages sent by these processes to other processes are lost and (3) from the (k + 1)-st step onwards, the correct processes (in F ) take steps in a round-robin fashion. Note that in R BAD , (1) process q k delivers m 0 at the k-th step, (2) correct processes (in F ) only take steps after the k-th step, (3) these processes never receive a message sent by the time of the k-th step, and so (4) correct processes (in F ) never deliver m 0 -a contradiction. Thus, the list {q 0 , . . . , q k } contains at least one correct process (in F ), and so p can achieve the Θ-accuracy property by outputting this list.
The list {q 0 , . . . , q k } that p generates, however, may contain processes that crash (in F ). Thus, to achieve Θ-completeness, p must continuously repeat the simulation above to generate new {q 0 , . . . , q k } lists, such that eventually the lists contain only correct processes (in F ). In order to guarantee that, p must ensure that the path [q 0 , d 0 , k 0 ], [q 1 , d 1 , k 1 ], . . . , [q , d , k ] that it uses to extract {q 0 , . . . , q k } eventually includes only vertices of processes that do not crash. That will be true if all the processes that crash in F , do so before q 0 obtains d 0 at its k 0 -th step. Therefore, process p can achieve Θ-completeness (as well as Θ-accuracy) by simply periodically reselecting a new path
Having given an overall account of how the transformation T D→Θ works, we now explain it in more detail. In what follows, let S be a sequence of pairs consisting of a process name and a failure detector value, that is,
. Let m 0 be an arbitrary fixed message. Given S, we can simulate an execution of A URB in which (1) process q 0 initially invokes broadcast(m 0 ) and (2) for j = 0, . . . , k, the j-th step of A URB is taken by process q j ; in that step, q j obtains d j from its local failure detector module, and receives the oldest message addressed to it that it has not yet received (if there are no such messages, it receives nothing). We define Delivered (S) to be true if process q k delivers m 0 in the k-th step of this simulation.
The detailed algorithm that transforms D to Θ is given in Fig. 3 . As we explained above, each process p maintains a directed acyclic graph DAG p , whose nodes are triples [q, d, seq] . The transformation algorithm has three tasks; in the first task, a process p periodically queries its local failure detector, creates a new node [p, d, curr] in DAG p and adds an edge from all other nodes in DAG p to this new node. Then, p uses A URB to broadcasts its new DAG p to all processes. In the second task, upon the delivery of < DAG q from a process q, process p merges its own DAG p with DAG q . In the third task, process p loops forever. In the loop, p first waits until its Task 1 adds a new node to DAG p , and then waits until there is a path starting at this new node that satisfies Delivered . Once p finds such a path, it sets the output of D to the set of all processes that appear in the path. Then, process p restarts the loop.
The detailed correctness proof of this algorithm is given in [ATD99] .
On the Nature and Power of Failure Detectors
As we mentioned in the introduction, to understand the meaning of a statement such as "D is the weakest failure detector...", or "D is necessary...", we need to know the universe of failure detectors under consideration. For such minimality results to be significant, the universe of failure detectors should be reasonable. In particular, it should not include failure detectors that provide information 
Fig. 3. Transformation of D to D = Θ
that have nothing to do with failures, e.g., hints on which messages have been broadcast, information about the internal state of processes, etc. To see why, suppose that a "failure detector" is allowed to indicate whether a message m was broadcast; then processes could use it solve the URB problem without ever sending any messages! Similarly, with the Consensus problem, if a "failure detector" could peek at the initial value of a process and provide this value to all processes, processes could use it to solve Consensus without messages and without W [CHT96] . Thus, a failure detector should be defined as an oracle that provides information about failures only.
In [HR99] , it is not clear what information failure detectors are allowed to provide: On one hand, the formal model defines failure detectors as generic ora-
cles;
6 on the other hand, their behavior is implicitly restricted by a closure axiom (on the set of runs of the system) that is introduced later in the paper.
7 The difficulty is that this axiom is technical and quite complex; furthermore, it does not mention failure detectors and it captures other assumptions that are not related to failure detection (e.g., the fact that processes are using a full-information protocol). Thus, the nature and power of the failure detectors that actually satisfy this axiom, and the universe of failure detectors under consideration, are not entirely clear.
Relation between G and Θ
In environment E f , Θ is at least as weak as G f , that is, it is possible to transform G f to Θ in E f . This transformation is given in Fig. 4 . Initially, each process p sets its failure detector output to Π (trust all processes). There are three concurrent tasks. In the first task, p repeatedly sends "I-am-alive" to all processes in the system. In the second task, when p receives one such message from process q, it adds q to the set got . In the third task, process p loops forever. In each iteration, p checks whether at some time G f has output a pair (S, k) such that k > |S| − n + min(f, n − 1) and got contains the complement of S. In that case, p sets its failure detector output to got , and then resets got to the empty set. Fig. 4 
Theorem 3. The algorithm in
The proof is simple, and can be found in [ATD99] .
Related Work
The difference between the concepts of Agreement and Uniform Agreement was first pointed out in [Had86] in a comparison of Consensus versus Atomic Commitment. The term "Uniform" was introduced in [GT89, NT90] , where it was studied in the context of Reliable Broadcast. In these papers, it is shown that with send and receive omission failures, URB can be solved if and only if a majority of processes are correct.
[BCBT96] consider systems with process crashes and fair (lossy) links, and addresses the following question: given any problem P that can be solved in a system where the only possible failures are process crashes, is P still solvable if links can also fail by losing messages? [BCBT96] shows that if P can be solved 6 Even though the definition of a failure detector states that it must output a set S of processes, and that S should be "interpreted" as processes suspected of being faulty, there is nothing in the definition to enforce this interpretation: the model does not tie the output S to the crashes that occur in a run. Thus, the formal definition allows a failure detector to use its output S to encode information that has nothing to do with failures. 7 This is axiom A4 in [HR99] .
Concluding Remarks
In some environments, URB can be solved without failure detectors at all, and this seems to contradict the fact that Θ is the weakest failure detector for URB in any environment. There is no contradiction, however, because in such environments Θ can be implemented.
For example, as we saw in the previous section, URB can be solved without failure detectors in an environment E maj where a majority of processes are correct. This does not contradict Theorem 2 because Θ can be implemented in E maj , as we now explain.
To implement Θ in E maj , processes periodically send an "I-am-alive" message to all processes, and each process p keeps a list of processes Order p . This list records the order in which the last "I-am-alive" message from each process is received. More precisely, Order p is initially an arbitrary permutation of the processes, and when p receives an "I-am-Alive" message from q, p moves q to the front of Order. To obtain Θ, a process p repeatedly outputs the first (n + 1)/2 processes in Order p as the set of trusted processes. It is easy to see why this implementation works: any process that crashes stops sending "I-am-alive" messages, and so it eventually moves towards the end of Order p and remains there forever afterwards. Since at most (n − 1)/2 processes crash, all processes that crash are eventually and permanently among the last (n − 1)/2 processes in Order p -so they do not appear among the first (n + 1)/2 processes. Thus our implementation satisfies Θ-completeness. To see that it also satisfies Θ-accuracy, note that among the first (n + 1)/2 processes in Order p , there is always at least one correct process (since no majority of processes can crash in E maj ).
In general, from the transformation algorithm in Fig. 3 , the following obviously holds:
Remark 4. Consider an asynchronous distributed system with process crashes and fair links, and with environment E. If URB can be solved in E without any failure detectors then Θ can be implemented in E.
